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Should the EU or its Member States be held liable for those actions committed by a Member
State when implementing EU law? Furthermore, the vertical division of competences gives rise to plenty of disagreement, especially on issues of international responsibility. 9 In other words, should the way in which the EU bears responsibility entail any kind of consequence as regards the division of competence?
As a response to these concerns, the EU, when concluding international agreements, negotiates the inclusion of different techniques dealing with these questions. These techniques range from pragmatic solutions like denying the existence of any potential issue regarding the EU's responsibility to setting up procedures to follow whenever there is a responsibility claim.
Whereas these different approaches could prima facie solve the problems posed by the EU's international responsibility through managerial techniques, 10 this chapter shows how these techniques do not completely solve the problems posed by the EU's violation of its international obligations. On the contrary, it shows how these techniques can add more uncertainty and exacerbate the inter-institutional discussions over the division of competences. The chapter is structured into three sections. Section II identifies the different interests which guide the different techniques used by the EU when dealing with its international responsibility. Section III focuses on how these interests have been taken into account in procedures dealing with the EU's international responsibility. Section IV provides some conclusions as to the direction to which these mediating strategies should move forward.
II. The Guiding Principles of the EU's International Responsibility
The international responsibility of the EU can be seen as the conjunction of different interests.
First, there is the non-EU party to the international agreement which when faced with a breach on the EU side demands reparations. Moreover, 11 third parties might fear that the EU and its
Member States could hide behind each other, avoiding their responsibilities. 12 In other words, third parties might be concerned that the EU's participation in international agreement could lead to a gap in its responsibility. Second, the EU when acting externally might want to assert its autonomy from its Member States, both at the institutional level (ie, the EU is a distinct legal subject with its own separate legal personality) and at the competence level (ie, the EU is an autonomous legal order separate from both international and national law). Furthermore, this autonomy would also entail a certain degree of respect or cooperation from the Member States towards the EU. 13 Third, EU Member States might want to preserve their autonomy from incursion by the EU. This is reflected in their narrow reading of the division of competences with the EU. 14 Since the autonomy of EU law entails its supremacy over Member States legislation in those areas in which there is a transfer of powers, Member States can only safeguard their autonomy in those areas not transferred to the EU. Consequently, EU Member States have a clear interest in upholding a strict reading of the division of competences. This section examines how the EU's treaty-making practice deals with these divergent interests. It is divided into two parts. The first identifies the different principles which guide the EU's treaty-making practice and international responsibility, while the second conceptualises the different techniques used by the EU to reconcile these organising principles.
A. Diverging Interests as Principles of EU International Responsibility
In the EU's treaty-making practice, we can identify at least three different principles: legal certainty, the vertical division of powers and the duty of cooperation. The Commission has explicitly mentioned these three interests as the organising principles guiding the EU´s action in the field of investment. 15 More precisely, these principles need to be taken into account when managing the consequences of a responsibility claim. 16 They are also mentioned in the draft of 13 Article 4(3) TEU; C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR I-03317. 14 See below, note 20.
15 European Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party' COM(2012) 335 final. 16 ibid. Furthermore, the Commission also mentions a new organising principle in the area of international investment: budget neutrality. However, it is not completely clear how this principle would operate in this area of international law, and whether it can and should be extended to other instances of the EU's treaty-making practice.
the EU's accession to the ECHR and explain the need for a special procedure to deal with the EU's responsibility under this agreement. 17 
i. The Vertical Division of Competences
The division of competences is undoubtedly one the main principles guiding the EU's treatymaking practice. The inherent tension between attributed and implied powers has a marked influence on the EU's treaty-making power and responsibility. 18 The different perspectives on the division of powers resemble the principal-agent dilemma. On the one hand, the Member
States have delegated some functions to the EU to achieve certain objectives. 19 On the other hand, Member States fear that the EU might not act in accordance with its conferred functions and objectives. In other words, EU Member States are reluctant to accept wide treaty-making powers to the EU given the moral hazard and the conflict of interests that this could entail. As a consequence of this tension, for instance, the Council during the 1980s clearly rejected the doctrine of parallelism as established by the Court of Justice. 20 More recently, in a similar vein, the UK decided to veto more than 70 EU statements to UN committees, insisting that these statements should be delivered on behalf of the 'EU and its Member States' rather than simply on behalf of the EU. 21 The Council in the 1980s and the UK in recent times show the unease underpinning the transfer of power to the EU. The Member States do not completely trust the EU as regards the powers delegated to it.
Consequently, the EU in its treaty-making practice will try to balance between its own interests and power and the Member States' reluctance to allow the EU to act with complete autonomy. In this respect, the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements enshrined As it has been shown in this section, the diverging interests regarding the division of competences run deeper within the EU's treaty-making practice than it might appear at first sight. Therefore, it seems logical that when speaking about the responsibility of the EU under 22 Arrangement between the Council and the Commission concerning participation in international negotiations on raw materials (PROBA 20 [I]nterminable discussions will ensue to determine whether a given matter falls within the competence of the Community, so that the Community mechanisms laid down by the relevant provisions of the Treaty will apply, or whether it is within the competence of the Member States, in which case the consensus rule will operate. The Community's unity of action vis-à-vis the rest of the world will thus be undermined and its negotiating power greatly weakened.
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In this paragraph the Court clearly highlighted how the diverging interests in the division of powers can negatively affect the legal certainty of third parties and consequently also negatively affect other interests at stake in the WTO agreement. Therefore, the Court proposed that in situations such as the one at stake:
[I]t is essential to ensure close co-operation between the Member States and the Community institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community. but also in the interests of the legal certainty of third parties that the EU does not send incoherent messages.
By recognising a duty to cooperate and not a legal obligation solving the diverging interest, the Court understood that Article 4(3) could serve as a managerial device. 36 By not creating a specific legal obligation on either the EU or its Member States, the duty allows any result of that cooperation to be contextualized. The outcome of such cooperation will not bind any of the parties cooperating in future arrangements.
However, in recent years the duty has started to evolve to become an organising principle, an interest on its own. The Court recognised that the duty of cooperation, in its unity of external representation principle facet, 37 was one of the interests to take int account when laying down procedural strategies in international agreements. In the Food and Aliments Organisation negotiation would involve giving preference to some interests over others. However, the different negotiators might not be willing to compromise on certain interests or principles. To reconcile these different diverging interests in an international agreement, the parties might include different legal techniques which mediate between these diverging interests. 45 However, these techniques would not provide a solution on how to balance those interests. Instead, they provide a simulacrum of consensus at the level of abstract principles or interests. 46 The strategy apparently makes the diverging interests or principles converge, either by creating a legal vacuum in which the principles seem to meet or by postponing the decision on how the diverging principles come together. Consequently, the problems linked with these diverging interests will usually surface in the implementation or responsibility stage of the life-cycle of the agreement.
These organising techniques can range from pragmatic solutions, which disregard the different interests altogether, to procedures in which the parties can discuss how the different principles will apply to a specific situation. In the EU's treaty-making practice, these organising techniques have become common features, mixed agreements being the most obvious example. Mixed agreements are international agreements to which both the EU and its Member States are parties. 47 By concluding the agreement jointly, the EU and its Member States set aside the question on the division of competences. 48 While it is clear that the EU had competence to conclude the agreement, the extent to which the EU has exercised its competences on that agreement is left unanswered. In other words, the discussion on the division of competences is abandoned so as to conclude the agreement. Hence, mixed agreements seem to alleviate many of the problems concerning the EU's treaty-making practice from a pragmatic standpoint. 49 By leaving all the difficult questions floating in a legal vacuum, mixity postpones any problem to the implementation and 
ii. The Proceduralisation of the EU's Responsibility
Similarly, procedural solutions also seem to alleviate the conflict between the different diverging interests. As Koskenniemi rightly notes, 'proceduralisation … is a useful means to avoid arguing about binding obligations in a way that might seem to overrule one sovereign will with another'. 57 The international agreement enshrines a procedural framework to deal with any doubt regarding the compliance of the EU and its Member States. Proceduralisation is one of the most common features of the EU's treaty-making practice.
Whenever there is some kind of disagreement between the diverging interests underpinning an international agreement, the EU and the other parties to the agreement tend to favour the inclusion of a procedural framework. The agreement defers the solution of the conflict between the diverging interests into procedures and future decision making. cases of 'special urgency'. 63 Therefore, in terms of responsibility, the breach of human rights obligation may or may not entail a breach of the Cotonou Agreement (even if it is one of its essential elements) depending on the outcome of the consultations. Moreover, it would also be difficult to extract general conclusions of the practice since the outcome will always depend on negotiations and not the application of rules. In other words, similar violations might entail different responsibilities.
These different techniques ranging from pragmatic legal vacuums to the inclusion of procedures are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, pragmatic solutions do not exclude procedural strategies and vice versa. Many mixed agreements (the paradigm of pragmatic solutions in the EU's treaty-making practice) 64 envisage procedures designed to deal with these diverging interests. Returning to the example of the Palermo Convention, whereas the mixed nature of the agreement made it possible to postpone any conflict regarding the EU's powers, the claims for legal certainty were not dealt with satisfactorily. Third parties demanded further assurances. 65 Thus, in addition to the joint participation of the EU and its Member States with regard to the Convention, third parties also demanded a procedure aiming at dealing with any issue regarding the EU's power which might arise during the implementation of the agreement. 66 This feature has become more and more relevant in recent years as the complexity of the procedures gives a certain degree of flexibility to the EU and its Member States to reach a decision. In such [a] case, upon the request of the Investor, the Communities and the Member States concerned will make such determination within a period of 30 days.
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However, this declaration did not stop third parties from bringing cases against EU Member
States over issues of EU law. 71 Against this backdrop, the Commission in its policy document mentioned the issue of the EU's responsibility. It stressed that the 'issue of the international responsibility between the EU and the Member States in EU investment agreements needs to be addressed'. 72 However, the proposal remained silent as to the attribution of wrongful acts or any specific rules which could apply to the EU and/or its Member States. Instead, it addressed the issue through the EU's participation in future investment disputes. According to the Commission Communication, 'Given the exclusive external competence, [the EU] will also be the sole defendant regarding any measure taken by a Member State which affects investments by third country nationals or companies falling within the scope of the agreement concerned' 73 and it pointed out that further rules on responsibility would be tackled in future legislation. Overall, the Commission's Communication shows how the issue of responsibility is not going to be approached from a rulebased perspective. Instead, the Commission will propose a procedural framework which would allow it to express its views on how the responsibility should be attributed in a specific case.
The Commission's proposal for a regulation to manage financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals 74 lays down the legal framework in which a solution to the question of responsibility in investment agreements can be agreed. The explanatory memorandum rightly differentiates between the procedures aiming at allowing the EU to participate in an investment dispute from the issue of the allocation of financial responsibility. In other words, the proposed regulation aims to cover the different stages of an investment dispute from the initiation of the proceedings to the payment of the eventual compensation that the arbitrators might establish. The proposal understands that:
[W]here the treatment of which an investor complained originates in the institutions of the Union (including where the measure in question was adopted by a Member State as required by Union law), financial responsibility should be borne by the Union.
Therefore, given the exclusive nature of the investment competence, the explanatory memorandum seems to favour the EU's sole responsibility in this area. In other words, the Commission in the explanatory memorandum tries to make the different interests coalesce (the autonomy of the EU, the autonomy of it Member States and the legal certainty of third parties)
by establishing the EU's sole responsibility whenever it excercises its competence. Article 3 of the proposal takes up this idea. Article 3(1) reads as follows:
1. Financial responsibility arising from a dispute under an agreement shall be apportioned according to the following criteria:
(a) the Union shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by the institutions, bodies or agencies of the Union; (b) the Member State concerned shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by that Member State, except where such treatment was required by the law of the Union.
Notwithstanding point (b) of the first subparagraph, where the Member State concerned is required to act pursuant to the law of the Union in order to remedy the inconsistency with the law of the Union of a prior act, that Member State shall be financially responsible unless the adoption of such prior act was required by the law of the Union.
The provision mandates financial responsibility in the framework of investment arbitration.
Whenever an EU organ commits a wrongful act, it is for the EU to bear responsibility. Likewise, breaches committed by organs of EU Member States should be attributed to the Member States, unless they were acting under the EU's normative control. Given the exclusive nature of FDI, these rules of attribution respond to the fact that EU Member States would not be allowed to act in the field of FDI unless the EU empowered them to do so. The proposed regulation is a perfect example on the recent trend in the proceduralisation of the responsibility of the EU. On the one hand, it creates a legal vacuum in relation to responsibility. Even though the proposal lays down rules as to the allocation of responsibility, the proposal also allows the EU and its Member States to override these rules and modify the allocation of responsibility depending on the specific case. Thus, the Member States and the EU can leave the exact scope of the EU's competence on FDI unsettled. 76 On the other hand, the uncertainty that the variable responsibility would entail is diminished to a certain extent by the different procedures enshrined in the regulation. The regulation assumes that by laying down procedural rules on participation, the legal certainty of third parties is safeguarded. Transparency in how the decisions as to the participation of the EU and its Member States are taken should satisfy the concerns of third parties. This is especially clear in Article 17, which provides for a procedure which would allow the third party to get its award even when there is no agreement between the EU and its Member States as to who bears the financial responsibility for this. In spite of this procedure, the legal certainty of other third parties is not completely safeguarded with these procedural strategies. Since each case can be approached in very different ways, depending on how the EU and its Member States decide to approach the dispute, third parties will have difficulties in trying to predict how their dispute will turn out.
Overall, the proposed regulation is a mixture of pragmatism and proceduralisation aimed at safeguarding the legal certainty of third parties while at the same time taking into account the complexities underpinning the division of competences and the autonomy of EU law. However, the ECtHR decisions on EU law are just some of the issues which are attracting scholarly attention. 77 In addition, the issue of the responsibility within the ECtHR poses very interesting questions. 78 In a similar vein to the proposed regulation in the field of FDI, the draft accession agreement 79 and its explanatory report 80 The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the 'European Convention') provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to: … (b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate.
The EU considers that insofar as its specific characteristics are preserved, the legal certainty of third parties would also be preserved. The protocol and, by extension, EU Member States are concerned that the mixed character of the ECHR can lead to the incorrect targeting of the EU or its Member States. The mechanism should give the subject bringing the claim the certainty that somebody will be held responsible for the violation of the ECHR. At the same time, it should also give EU Member States the certainty that they will not be held liable for acts which fall outside their competence. Furthermore, in order to to safeguard the autonomy of the EU Member
States, the same protocol enshrines in its Article 2 that: 'The agreement referred to in Article 1
shall ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions.' Therefore, the accession agreement should take all these different interests into account when drafting its responsibility rules.
To deal with all these diverging concerns, the draft legal agreement on the EU's accession to the ECHR establishes a new model of the proceduralisation of EU participation in international agreements. The draft agreement enshrines the so-called co-respondent mechanism which provides a procedure designed to allow the EU or its Member State to intervene so as to 'ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union'. In this regard, Article 36(4) ECHR as modified by the draft legal instrument provides that:
The European Union or a Member State of the European Union may become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings.
This provision enshrines a procedure by which the EU and its Member States will jointly participate in the proceedings brought against any of them. The aim of this procedure, as already mentioned, is to balance between the sui generis nature of the EU and the legal certainty of the other parties to the proceedings. As the explanatory report shows, the co-respondent mechanism is 'a way to avoid gaps in participation, accountability and enforceability in the Convention system'. In other words, the mixed participation of the EU and its Member States summed up with the complex nature of the EU's legal system y could create to gaps in terms of responsibility, which in this context means gaps in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Consequently, the co-respondent mechanism establishes that the EU or its Member
States will take part in the proceedings whenever the compatibility between an EU law instrument and a provision of the ECHR is called into question. 81 Moreover, though the article does not establish any rule on attribution or responsibility, it appears that the responsibility of the EU and its Member States will be joint in this respect.
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The co-respondent mechanism establishes two different procedures depending on whether the breach stems from an EU primary norm or from a secondary norm. The rationale behind the co-respondent is to lay down a procedure to involve those ECHR contracting parties that are necessary to put an end to the human rights violation. By allowing the EU and/or its Member States to act as co-respondents, the draft agreement tries to ensure, as was pointed out above, that there will not be gaps in responsibility. However, a closer look at the co-responding mechanism will show that certain gaps in accountability will still remain after the EU's accession to the ECHR. The main criticisms are aimed towards the voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism. Like Article 3(2) of the proposed regulation in the field of FDI, Article 3(2) and 3(3)
of the draft agreement is worded in such a way that the procedure dealing with the EU's responsibility does not establish a clear obligation on the EU and its Member States to intervene.
Instead, both provisions provide that the 'the European Union Member States may become corespondents' as regards violations of the ECHR stemming from an EU primary rule and that 'the European Union may become a co-respondent' as regards violations stemming from EU secondary legislation. The wording of all these provisions gives the idea that the EU and its
Member States have the last word as to becoming co-respondents. Regardless of whether they actually bear responsibility over the violation, the EU and/or its Member States can avoid being held responsible by simply not joining the proceedings. This is confirmed by the explanatory report, which clearly states that:
81 Draft Revised Agreement (n 78) 17. 82 ibid 18. However, see comment 4 on p 2 of the same document.
No High Contracting Party may be compelled against its will to become a co-respondent. This reflects the fact that the initial application was not addressed against the potential co-respondent, and that no High Contracting Party can be forced to become a party to a case where it was not named in the original application.
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While this might be seen as a pragmatic solution designed to postpone and contextualise any decision regarding the division of competences, the voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism might be seen as problematic in terms of the effective protection of human rights in Europe. Regardless of the fact that it preserves the autonomy of the EU's legal order, 84 the voluntary nature can potentially create uncertainty as to who is going to intervene in the proceedings. Allowing the EU and its Member States to decide whether to join a specific case can create inconsistencies as regards their expected intervention. They might decide that in a specific case it is better not to intervene, whereas in another case with very similar facts, they might decide the contrary and join the proceedings as co-respondents. Inasmuch as the corespondent mechanism allows the EU and its Member States to decide whether or not to join proceedings against the other, that decision would always have to be approached as an ad hoc decision which cannot be generalized. This case by case approach to the issue of responsibility could create uncertainty as to whether in similar situations the application ofthe co-respondent mechanism would have been the same.
IV. Conclusions
To deal with different interests, the EU in its treaty-making practice has included different kinds of mechanisms. The creation of legal vacuums (eg, mixed agreements) or proceduralisation of the participation and responsibility within international agreements are just some general examples of this trend. Nevertheless, these mediating strategies provide a simulacrum of consensus. The different interests do not meet; instead, through ad hoc solutions and procedures, the strategies favour certain interests over others in specific situations. Therefore, any solution to the conflict between the different interests or principles will be contextualised, meaning that the solution would be an ad hoc solution which might not be extrapolated to similar situations.
